Introduction
A situation in which a finite set of players l/ C lN can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperCI,tiue game wi,th transferable utilitg (or simply a TU-game), being a pair (l[,r) where u:2N --lR is a characteristi,c functi'on on N satisfying u(A):0. The collection of all characteristic functions on a particular player set ly' is denoted by 9N. In a TU-game there are no restrictions on the cooperation possibilities of the players, i.e., every coalition E C N is formable and can generate a payoff. An example of models in which there are restrictions on the possibilities of cooperation are the ganxes i,n coali,ti,on structure as considered in, e.g., Aumann and Drdze (7974), Owen (7977) , ' Hart and Kurz (1983) and Winter (1989) . In these models it is assumed that the players are part of a coalition structure being a partition of the players into disjoint sets. These sets can be seen as social groups such that for a particular player it is more easy to cooperate with players in his own group than to cooperate with players in other groups' Another example of models with restricted cooperation possibilities are the games with l1m6ted, communicati,on structure in which the edges of an undirected graph on the set of players represent binary communication links between the players. Whether players can cooperate or not then depends on their position in the communication graph. For 2 such models we refer to, e.g., Myerson (1977) , Kalai, Postlewaite, and Roberts (1978) ' Owen (1986) and Borm, Owen, and Tijs (1992) . This paper considers ganxes wi,th a perrnission stntcture in which it is assumed that players in a TU-game are part of a hierarchical organization in which there are piayers that need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate within a coalitionl. Thus the possibilities of coalition formation are determined by the positions of the players in this so-called permi,ssi,on structure. Various assumptions can be made about how a permission structure affects the cooperation possibilities. In the conjunctiue approach, as developed in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink (1992) and van den Brink and Gilles (1996) , it is assumed that every player needs permission from all its direct superiors before it is allowed to cooperate with other players. Alternatively, in the d,i,sjuncti,ue approach, as considered in Gilles and Owen (1994) and van den Brink (1gg7) it is assumed that every player needs permission from af least one of its direct superiors before it is allowed to cooperate with other players.
Given a game and a permission structure a modified game is defined which takes account of the limited cooperation possibilities. The conjunctive and disjunctive approach yield different modified games. An allocati,on rule for games with a permission structure is a function that assigns to every game with a permission structure a distribution of the payoffs that can be obtained by cooperation over the individual players. Applying solutions for TU-games (being function that assign a payoff distribution to every TU-game) to these modified games yields allocation rules for games with a permission structure. Applying, for example, the Shapleg ualue (Shapley (1953) ) to these modified games yields the conjuncti,ue and di,siuncti,ue permissi,on ualue which have been characterized in van den Brink and Gilles (1996) and van den Brink (1997)' respectively.
Another well known solution for TU-games is the Banzhaf ualue which is based on the Banzhaf index for voting games (Banzhaf (1965) ), and is generalized to arbitrary games by, ".g., Owen (1975) and Dubey and Shapley (1979) . Axiomatizations of the Banzhaf value for TU-games can be found in, e.g., Lehrer (1983) and Haller (1994)' possibilities in a TU-game are limited by some hierarchical structure on the set ofplayers can be found in Faigle and Kern (1993 In Section 4 we chara ctefize the disjunctive Banzhaf permission value using, a.o, fairness, predecessor fairness, and two axioms that are related to the neutrality axioms used in characterizing the Banzhaf value for TU-games in Lehrer (1988) Gilles and Owen (1994) fr(N,u,S) -f{N,u,S-,,',i)) : fi(N,u,S) -/r(N, u,S-6,i7) for atl i' e {h} U 5-11n;' Theorem 2.10 (van den Brink (1997)) An allocation rule f is equal to the d'isjuncti,ue permi,ssion ualue pd if and onty if i,t sati,sfies ffici'encg, addi'ti,ui,ty, the inessenti,al player proper-ty, the necessarg player property, weak structural monotonici'ty and faimess.
The conjunctive permission value does not satisfy fairness. However, it satisfies the alternative axiom which states that deleting the relation between two players h and j e S(h) (with lS-t(j)l > 2) changes the payoffs of player j and any other predecessor g e S-IU) \ {h} by the same amount. Moreover, also the payoffs of all piayers that 'completely' dominate the other predecessor g change by this same amount' Axiom 2.11 (Conjunctive fairness) For euery.lf C lN, u e gN and S € SI, if h,j,9 € N are suchthathlg and, j eS(h))S(9),then fr(N,u,S) -fo(N,u,S-6,i1) : fi(N,,u,S) -ft(N,u,S-6,i1) for alt i e {g} u 3-t(g)' eleting a communication relation between two players in a symmetric communication graph has the same effect on both their payoffs. Note that in our fairness property we require that the successor on the relation to be deleted has at least two predecessors.
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Theorem 2,L2 (van den Brink (1999)) An allocati,on rule f is equal to the conjunctiue perm'issi,on ualue p" if and, only i,f it sati,sfies fficiency, addi'ti'uitg, the i'nessential plager proper-ty, the necessary player property, weak structural monotonici,ty and co nj un cti,u e f ai,rn e s s.
In van den Brink and Gilles (1996) it is shown that on the class of all games with an arbitrary (not necessarily hierarchical) permission structure, the conjunctive permission value is characterized by efficiency, additivity, the inessential player property' the necessary player property and. structural monotonicity. This last property is a strengthening of weak structural monotonicity and states that a player in a monotone game with a permission structure always earns at least as much as any of its successors, i."., fi(l/,u,^9) > fi(N,u,,s) for altz e l{ and j e s(1,). The disjunctivepermission value does not satisfy structural monotonicity. : #, D (r(o1,"(E)) -u(o{,r(E\ {h})) -u(olu,r-<n,,)(E)) l_ u(olo,r-,o,,,(E \ {h})))
This shows that pd satisfies predecessor fairness.
To show that B" satisfies predecessor fairness note that o"*,s(E) : 6"w,s-6,i, (f; if E ) h or E / g. But then, in a similar way as above fot Bd, it follows that (r@"*,r-,n,,)(E)) -u(o"*,r(E))) : #=,f ('t*,s-(,,,i)(E)) -u(ain,"(E))) So, we are left to show that Bd satisfies fairness. Let ,S € 5# and h,i e N be such that j €,S(h) and lS-10)l > 2. Further,Iet'i € {h} uS-1(h). 19 Since E / {i^,j} implies that o$,"( E) : olv,s-<n,it (E)' it follows that Bl@,u,,S) -B!(N,u, S-6,i1) : B,i,(N,r!v,u,s) - Bo(N, rlv, u, 11) -
So, 0o satisfies fairness.
n Next we show that the axioms mentioned in Theorem 4.5 characterize the disjunctive Banzhaf permission value. We do this in some steps. First, we prove the following lemma for positively scaled unanimity games with a permission tree that has no inessential players. We denote bV Sfl : {,S € S# | for all i, e N,ls-t(i)l < 1} the class of all permission trees on .fly'. For 5 € S# and h € l/ the permission structure S-n e SN\{h} is given by ;-n(z): l t(n) if ze l{\({h}u^9-1(h)).
Lemma 4.6 If the allocati,on rule f sati,sfi,es one player ffici'ency, uerti,cal neutralitg, hori,zontal neutrali,ty, the necessary player property, wu'k structural monotoni'city and If l,Afl :1 then one player efficiency implies that f6(N,*r,S) -cr for i' e N.
Proceeding by induction assume that f,i(N' ,wv', St) : #A for all (N' ,w7','S') with ,S' € Sfl', c7r ) 0 and llf'l < llf l.
We distinguish the following three cases (of which at least one must occur). if z e lr\s-'(h) (Note that ,9// € Sr"{0t., The necessary player property and weak structural monotonicity implY that fi,(lf u {g}, wr,S"): fi(N U {g}, wr,S"): /r(lf U {g}, wr,S")' (7) since ((lru ig)) \ {h},orurt1n1,s'!n) € sfNu{s})\{h} (with l(lru {g} \ {h})l : l,nfl) is as considered in case (ii) it follows from that case that /r((N u tgi) \ {h}, 4ur11n}t S':h) : /n((lr u {g}) \ {h}, crur\{h}15':h) : #= But then horizontal neutrality implies that fi(.n[ U {g},wr, St:@,i)) + /v(lf U {9},wr, S!@,il): /i((lr u {gi) \ {h}, orur\{h}, S!) : ,ffi-with the necessary player property and weak structural monotonicity this yields fi, (lru{g} ,w7,5'!1n,il) : /i(l[u {g},wr,S'!6,i1): /s(lru{ 9},wr',5'!6,1): fr'tal Now, predecessor fairness implies that /n(Nu{g},wr,S")-/n(lru{g},w7,St:17,11):/n(lru{g},w7,5!6,i)-/r(lru{g}'wr,S"), 22 which with (7) and (8) So, for ,9 e Sfl and. w7 : cTLrfr with ca ) 0 and T US-l(") : ly', we conclude that f{IV,wr,S):6* : ,ffi: Bl(N',wr,S) for all i, eT U,3-1(") -lf' tr The next step is to show that adding the inessential player property and fairness to the axioms implies that / is uniquely determined for all positively scaled unanimity games with a permission tree. Lemma 4, 7 If the allocation rule f sati,sfies one player ffici,ency, uertical neutralitg, hori,zontal neutrality, the i,nessential player property, the necessary player property, wealc structural monotoni,ci,ty, fai,rness and, pred,ecessor fai,rness, then f (N,u,S) is uniquelg rletermined, wheneuer,S e Sfl andu: cr"uT for someT C N andot20' Pnoop Suppose that the allocation rule / satisfies the eight axioms. Consider a permission (tree) structure ,S e Sfl and monotone characteristic function 'uT : c7u7 as given in (6) Proceeding by induction assume that c* --fuo(N"u7,rSt) is uniquely determined for all (l/', w7, , St) with ,S' € Sfl', c7, ) 0 and ll{'\ a5'(7')l < llf \ os(?)l' since lr\o5(") lathere exists a i €.nr\o5(") with,s(j) : fl. we distinguishthe following three cases (of which at least one must occur)' 
So, from (11) and (12) 
With the inessential player property it then follows that f i(N,,ur, S') : f i(N,us7, S) : Q.
Predecessor fairness also yields that fir(lf, wr,S') -fu(N,w7,St-Q,s,nl) :,fi(l[, wT,S'-(do,h)) -fi'(lr,'u7,^9')' (15) Since ll/\o"troo,r)(")l < llr\o"(?)l and S'-1to,n) € sfl, the induction hvpothesis, (14) ""a (fS)yieldthat f6(N,wr,S'): fio (N, u7,,5'-1,i,o,nl) +/i(lf, wr,S'-Oo,n)) is uniquely determined. so, with (13) also c* : f6(N,ur,s) is uniquely de- termined.
(ii) suppose that there exists an h € as(T) n,S(,,0) such that i e 31n1. Take s e s@) n (s-1u) u {i}), and define In both cases we determined c*. Since We end this section by remarking that we can adapt the axioms so that the disjunctive Banzhaf permission value is axiomatized for games with a fixed player set. In that case also the notion of hierarchical permission structure should be adapted. Also we can restate the axiomatization for games with an acyclic permission structure (which is not necessarily quasi-strongly connected). For notational convenience we discussed games with a variable player set and a hierarchical permission structure. Theorem 5.1 An allocati,on rule f i,s equal to the conjunctiue Banzhaf permission ualue B" i,f and, onty i,f i,t satisf,es one player fficiency, uerti,cal neutrali,ty, horizontal neutrality, ad,diti,ui,ty, the i,nessenti.al player property, the necessarg player property, weak structural monotoni,ci,ty, conjuncti,ue fai,rness and predecessor fai,mess. Proving that the conjunctive Banzhaf permission permission value satisfies additivity, the inessential player property, the necessary player property and weak structural monotonicity is along the same lines as this is shown for the conjunctive (Shapley) permission value in van den Brink and Gilles (1996) . One player effi.ciency is evident. Vertical and horizontal neutrality of the conjunctive Banzhaf permission value follow from similar arguments given for the disjunctive Banzhaf permission value in the proof of Theorem 4.5, Predecessor fairness follows from Theorem 3.5.
